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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN P. DORITY,

)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
vs.
)
)
JEANNE D. DORITY,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.)

Appeal No. 17376

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce brought by the
plaintiff-appellant, John P. Dority, against his wife, Jeanne
D. Dority,

the defendant-respondent, who appeared and

counter-claimed for divorce.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT

The trial of this matter was held on August 1, 1980,
before the Honorable James
at 117).

s.

Sawaya (Record, hereinafter "R."

On August 4, 1980, the court issued its slip opinion

in the matter granting a decree of divorce to each party and
making the following division of property:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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To the respondent-1.

The real property on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon,

Pennsylvania.
2.

850 shares of Sperry Corporation stock and 100

shares of I.B.M. stock.
3.

A fund of about $2,000.00 in a Pennsylvania

checking account designated "Devon House Fund."
4.

Her retirement fund with TIAA-CREF.

5.

All personal property including automobiles,

furniture,

furnishings, etc. then in the name or

possession of respondent.
6.

Alimony in the sum of $500 per month for a period

of 36 months commencing September, 1980.
To the appellant-1.

The real property in respondent's name in Salt

Lake County.
2.

The remaining 844 shares of stock in the Sperry

Corporation and the remaining 120 shares of stock in
I.B.M.
3.

Stock in United Abestos Limited.

4.

His vested retirement fund held by the Sperry

Corporation.
5.

All personal property then in the possession or

name of the appellant.
Each party was to bear his or her own costs and attorneys' fees
(R. 115-16).

Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
-2-
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and the final Decree of Divorce, as prepared by counsel for
respondent, were filed August, 11, 1980 (R. 127-34).

On August

18, 1980, appellant filed his Notice of Objections to Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and to the Decree of Divorce along
with his Motion for a New Trial, or, in the Alternative,

for

Amendment of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decree of Divorce (R. 135-39).

A hearing on these objections

and on the Motion for a New Trial was held on September 17,
1980 (R. 140, 295-312).

Among other objections, it was noted

that Finding 6(b) gave an unduly depressed figure for the
equity in the home at Devon, Pennsylvania, in part because the
equity had been reduced by the sum of $17,000 for a personal
loan made to respondent from her mother purportedly for the
purpose of maintaining and improving the Devon real property
which sum counsel for respondent admitted was not properly a
lien against the property (R. 297-99, Defendant's Exhibit 8).
Another objection made was the lack of sufficient evidence to
support the award of alimony in paragraph 9 of the Findings
(R.

301-04),

These and all other objections to the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, with the exception of the
correction of two typographical errors, were denied (R. 142).
on the Motion for New Trial, it was urged that the
court had failed to adequately consider the requirements of
Pennsylvania law with respect to the Pennsylvania real
property,
(R.

the house and lot located at Devon, Pennsylvania

308-09).

It was also urged that the evidence did not
-3-
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support the award of alimony (R. 301-03), and that the court
erred in not giving more consideration to Pennsylvania Law,
which up until one month before trial, did not allow for any
award of alimony after a decree of divorce in the circumstances
presented here and which provided that suits begun before the
effective date of the new law should generally continue under
the old law, except "upon application granted" (R. 306-08).
The court rejected these contentions, and specifically stated;
"I don't think the Pennsylvania law should apply in this
situation (R. 312-142).
Additional proposed findings were also submitted by
counsel for appellant, but these were never adopted by the
court (R. 311-12, 144-45).
The Notice of Appeal was filed October 16, 1980 (R.
147).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant requests that this Court reverse and vacate
that part of the Findings and the Decree of the trial court
which awarded the entire equity of the Pennsylvania real
property to the respondent and which provided for an award of
alimony.

Appellant also requests that this Court remand this

case to the trial court with an order directing the trial court
to declare that the parties are tenants in common of equal
one-half shares in value of the Pennsylvania real property, or,
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the alternative, to declare that appellant is entitled to
additional property equivalent in value to $23,000, the sum
appellant contributed,

from his separate property which he

brought to the marriage,

to the purchase of the real property

in Devon, Pennsylvania.

Appellant further requests that this

Court declare on remand that respondent is not entitled to any
alimony.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The parties were married in Binghamton, New York, on
April 15, 1956 (R.
(R. 202).

202).

The appellant was then 31 years old

The respondent was three years younger, as the

appellant was 55 and the respondent was 52 years old at the
time of trial (R. 202, 257).
At the time of the marriage of the parties, the
appellant was a patent attorney employed by the International
Business Machines Corporation in Endicott, New York, at an
annual salary of $12,667.20 (R. 202-03).

He had received a law

degree in 1950 from the University of Wisconsin, had been
admitted to practice law in the states of Wisconsin and Iowa,
and had been registered to practice in the United States Patent
Office as a patent attorney since early 1952 (R. 202-03).

At

the time of the marriage, the appellant owned a house and a lot
located in Endicott, New York, that had a value of about
$16,000 and was free and clear of any obligation and, by his
-5-
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own unrefuted testimony, appellant had approximately $26,000.00
in other assets, held principally in the form of government
bonds (R. 204-05, 242-43).

Although respondent testified she

did not know of appellant's $26,000 in assets at the time of
the marriage (259-60), she never denied that he had such assets
and she admitted that he owned the house in Endicott (R. 283).
The respondent, at the time of the marriage, was four
credits short of receiving her Bachelor's Degree at the
University of Minnesota, had been working as a reporter at a
daily newspaper at a monthly take-home salary of about $500,
which employment she quit about two weeks after the marriage,
and she brought according to her own testimony at most $500 in
savings into the marriage plus a wedding present of $500 from
her parents (R. 258-60).

Four children were born as issue of

the marriage in the years 1956 through 1960, and the two
youngest children, twins, were nineteen years old at the time
of the divorce trial (R. 205-259).

As these children have all

reached their majority, there is no issue as to their custody
or support.
In 1960, the appellant changed employers and began
working for the Sperry Rand Corporation, and as a result of
that change, the parties moved from the appellant's house in
Endicott, New York, to Rye, New York (R. 206-07).

Appellant

purchased a lot in Rye and constructed a home on that lot using
funds received from the sale of the house in Endicott, the
assets he brought into the marriage in 1956, and by taking a
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mortgage out for approximately $30,000 (R. 206).

The real

property in Rye was owned only in the name of the appellant (R.
207).
In 1966, when appellant's employer moved from New York
City to a suburb of Philadelphia, the appellant moved himself
and his family to another Philadelphia suburb by the name of
Devon.

He there acquired a house on Schoolhouse Lane for a

down payment of $10,000 and by taking out a mortgage of $25,000
(R. 207-08).

The down payment came from the proceeds of the

sale of the house in Rye, New York (R. 208).

The sale of the

Rye property netted about $40,000 after payment of the $30,000
mortgage and commissions, which $40,000 was about the same
amount invested by appellant from his separate property in the
Rye property, of which another $10,000 was used to make
improvements in the Devon property in the years 1967 through
1972 (R. 202-09).

The Devon property was placed in the name of

both parties as tenants by the entireties (R. 227-28).
The parties have been separated since August 7, 1972,
on which date the appellant returned home from work to find
that his wife and children had left and taken most of the
household furniture and furnishings with them.

Shortly

thereafter, a court order was entered requiring the appellant
to pay the sum of $1,100 per month for the support of his wife
and four children, of which $400 was allocated to the support
of the wife (R. 209-210, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

At that time

the appellant had a gross salary of $3,000 per month or $36,000
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per year (R. 210-211, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

The appellant

continued to reside in and to make the mortgage payments on the
house on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon until the latter part of
1978 (R. 211).

He also used another $3,000 from the proceeds

of the sale of the Rye property to make repairs on the Devon
property after the separation of the parties (R. 225).
After a separation of almost five years, the appellant
filed for divorce in Pennsylvania in 1977 (R. 212).

At that

time, appellant sought and obtained a court order reducing his
support obligations to his wife from $400 to $250 per month and
eliminating the requirement of support for the two older boys
who had reached the age of majority (R. 217, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 6).

The respondent had begun full time employment in

1976 (R. 266).

Moreover, the oldest child of the parties, Jim,

resided with appellant at the home on Schoolhouse Lane from
1975 until the appellant left in late 1978.

Also, the second

son, Ben, resided with them from January 1978 until the
appellant had to move to Salt Lake (R. 282).

Also, the

appellant has contributed to the support of these children
while attending college even after they gained their majority
(R.

282-83).
In August of 1978, the appellant learned that to continue

employment with his employer, the Sperry Corporation, he would
have to relocate to Salt Lake City (R. 215).

At that time, the

parties attempted to negotiate a settlement of the Pennsylvania
divorce proceeding which the respondent was contesting and to
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negotiate a property settlement but no agreement was reached
( R.

267-69).
At the time of the appellant's involuntary transfer in

late 1978, he was earning a gross salary of just slightly aver
$46,000 (R. 217).

Upon moving ta Salt Lake, the appellant

acquired a home at 3621 Oakview Drive for a purchase price of
$80,000 (R. 222).

This was financed by borrowing a down

payment of $27,000 for which appellant's stocks were pledged as
collateral ta Merrill Lynch, and by granting a mortgage to the
bank far the balance (R. 222, 230).

This property was not

acquired with any of the proceeds from the real property
located in Devon as the appellant has received no proceeds from
the Devon property (R. 222).
In June, 1979, after appellant had established
residency in Utah, and because of the frustration he had
experienced with respect ta the Pennsylvania divorce action,
which by then had dragged on far some two years, and fearing
that now that he was in Utah he would not be able to help move
it along, appellant filed for divorce in Utah (R. 218).
Respondent submitted ta the jurisdiction of the Utah court and
there is no issue as to the jurisdiction of this state over the
persons of both parties.
After appellant left the house in Devon in late 1978,
respondent did some general cleanup and repair work on the
place and began renting it out on July 1, 1979, at a rate of
$600 per month (R. 270-72).

As of July 1, 1980, this rent was
-9-
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increased to $650 per month (R. 271-72).

Three hundred dollars

of that amount is net income after payments of taxes, mortgage
payments, and maintenance (R. 272).

Respondent claimed at

trial to have borrowed about $17,000 from her mother to bring
all mortgage and tax payments on the Devon property current and
to make repairs, but that only about half of this personal loan
had been put into the restoration of the house or the making of
payments on it (R. 270-71).

On defendant's Exhibit 8, admitted

over the objection of counsel for appellant that the listing
and valuation of assets was not properly supported by
foundation testimony or other evidence (R. 278), the listing of
the assets of the parties improperly shows the $17,000 loan as
a reduction of the equity in the Devon real property (R.
297-98), which equity is further understated by the fact that
the appraisal of the Devon property dates from November 1979,
almost ten months before the trial (Deposition of Laurence

s.

Scott at pages 13-14, published at R. 256).
Defendant's Exhibit 9, admitted for illustrative
purposes only (R. 274), reflects the income of the parties at
the time of trial.

It shows that even without support from

appellant, respondent had a net monthly expendable income,
after taxes, of $1,332.02.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING THE ENTIRE
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE DEVON REAL PROPERTY
TO RESPONDENT.

A.

The Court Erred by Not Applying Pennsylvania Real Property
Law.
It is an often quoted principle that:
it is both the duty and the prerogative of this
court in an equitable action to review the law and
the facts and make its own findings and substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974).
However, appellant is quite cognizant of the discretion of a
trial court in a divorce action to adjust financial and
property interests, of the presumption of the validity that
usually attaches to the judgment of a trial court in such a
situation, and of appellant's burden to show on appeal that:
the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings as made; or there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Id. See also English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah
1977).

However, as this court has also noted, the discretion

of the trial court:
is not without limit nor immune from correction on
review, if that is warranted. Due to the
seriousness of such proceedings and the vital effect
they have on people's lives, it is also the
responsibility of this court to carefully survey
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what is done, and while the determinations of the
trial court are given deference and not disturbed
lightly, changes should be made if that seems
essential to the accomplishment and the desired
objectives of the decree .
DeRose v. DeRose 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221,

222 (1967).

See

also Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979).
In the present action, although it is undisputed that
the trial court had jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties, an important part of the property to be divided was
the real property located on Schoolhouse Lane in Devon,
Pennsylvania.

It is a well accepted proposition of law that a

court hearing a marriage dissolution proceeding should look to
the law of the situs of real property to determine how the
property or its proceeds should be allocated.

Haws v. Haws,

615 P.2d 978, 981 (Nev. 1980), Burton v. Burton, 23 Ariz. App.
159, 531 P.2d 204, 207 (1975), Barber v. Barber, 51 Cal.2d 244,
331 P.2d 628, 631 (1958).

This principle is particularly

applicable to the Devon real property inasmuch as it was used
as the marital residence from the time of its acquisition in
1966 to the time the parties separated in 1972.

It should also

be noted that the appellant continued to live there until late
1978 and since that time respondent has taken charge of the
property and has rented it out since July of 1979.
Both at trial and on the Motion for New Trial, counsel
for appellant asked the trial court to take judicial notice of
and to apply Section 501 of Title 68 of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes (R. 287-88,

308-309) which reads:
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Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter
[the statute dates to 1927] acquiring property as
tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall
thereafter hold such property as tenants in common
of equal one-half shares in value and either of them
may bring suit against the other to have the
property sold and the proceeds divided between
them.
[The version quoted is an amended version
effective June 27, 1980.]
The trial court's decree dividing the property of the
parties clearly did not apply this statute, for it awarded all
interest in the Devon property to the respondent.

Moreover, at

the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, the court stated:
"I don't think the Pennsylvania law should apply in this
situation, because every case law or statute holds otherwise"
(R. 312).

It is not clear what law '"holding otherwise" was had

in mind by the court because the cases cited above squarely
hold to the contrary.

Appellant has not been able to locate

any Utah law that is on point that would support the contention
of the trial court.
It should also be noted that 68 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann.§501 (Purdon) has been held by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania to be strictly applicable according to its terms.
Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 A.2d 548
(1973).

In Lykiardopoulos, the ex-husband, after a divorce,

sought a partition of property held in a tenancy by the
entireties during the existence of the marriage.

Among other

things, his former wife argued that before dividing the
proceeds received from the sale of the property, she was
entitled to expenses she had incurred to preserve and protect
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the property since the date of the parties separation.
Applying 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. §503 which provided for only
recorded liens to be deducted before division of proceeds,

the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the expenses incurred by
the former wife cold not be deducted before division of the
proceeds unless they had been reduced to a recorded lien
against the property.
In the action at bar, the trial court should have
similarly applied 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

§501 (Purdon) so as

to declare the parties tenants in common with equal one-half
shares in value to the Devon real property without any
deduction for the personal loan respondent received from her
mother.

This the trial court failed to do.

For having thus

failed to properly apply the Pennsylvania law which governs the
disposition of the Devon parcel of real property, the trial
court's findings and decree should be reversed and this court
should remand the case to the trial court with an order
directing that the trial court apply the law of Pennsylvania as
explained.

B.

In the Alternative, if this Court Does Not Deem the

Pennsylvania Law to be Applicable to the Devon Real Property,
The Trial Court Should be Directed to Award to Appellant The
Equivalent Value of the Separate Property Appellant Brought
Into the Marriage Which was Traced to the Acquisition of the
Devon Real Property.
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Even if this Court does not apply the Pennsylvania
Statute referenced above, Utah case law demands that appellant
be awarded the equivalent value of his separate property
brought to the marriage which was used in the acquisition of
the Devon real property.

Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326

(Utah 1980), Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193 (Utah 1974).
In Jesperson, this Court noted as recently as last year that
the "parties' respective contributions to the marriage" is an
important factor to consider in making a property division in a
divorce action.

In that case the wife brought to the marriage

assets valued at over $20,000 while the husband brought nothing
to the marriage.

A mobile home acquired during the marriage

was found to have been financed with some $19,000 that were the
separate funds of the wife.

Upon dissolution of the marriage,

this court affirmed the propriety of the trial court's action
in awarding to the wife an amount equal to the quanitity of her
separate funds used to acquire the mobile home before dividing
the remaining proceeds from the sale of the mobile home in the
following language:

"It was not unreasonable for the court to

permit plaintiff to withdraw from the marriage property the
equivalent of those assets plaintiff brought into the
marriage."

610 P.2d at 328.

In Humphreys, the principal asset acquired during the
marriage was a home used as the marital residence.

The

defendant husband admitted that the home was purchased with at
least $3,000 that had been the separate property of the
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plaintiff-wife.

The trial court held that any proceeds from

the sale of the home remaining after all mortgages,

liens,

judgments, and debts had been paid, were to be divided equally
between the parties.

This Court modified that decree so as to

require reimbursement to the plaintiff of the $3,400 she had
contributed from her separate funds to the purchase of the home
before dividing the proceeds that remained after the
satisfaction of the mortgages and tax liens and before paying
other debts of the parties.
In the case at bar, the marital residence in Devon,
Pennsylvania was also the principal asset acquired by the
parties during the period before they separated.

Although

appellant later acquired a residence in Salt Lake after his
involuntary transfer here with assets acquired since the
separation of the parties in 1972, it is only fair that if that
portion of the trial court's decree awarding the Devon property
to the respondent is to stand, that appellant first be awarded
an amount equivalent to the separate property he contributed to
the purchase of the Devon home.

This amount should be $23,000,

$10,000 of which went for the down payment in 1966, another
$10,000 of which went for improvements in the period 1966-1972,
and another $3,000 used for repairs in 1972 after the
separation of the parties (R. 208, 225).
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II
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE OR WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND SHOULD BE VACATED.

The decree of the trial court made an award of alimony
to respondent in the amount of $500 per month for a period of
36 months.

This monthly amount is twice what the appellant has

already been paying to the respondent for her support under the
pre-existing Pennsylvania decree of temporary support for three
years prior to trial for which there was no showing of hardship.
Because of the long duration of the residence of the
parties in Pennsylvania, the continued residence of the
respondent in Pennsylvania whose only contacts with Utah are
her two appearances in this action, the fact that the appellant
only came to Utah when his employment required him to do so,
the fact that appellant had been supporting his wife and
children since 1972 under a decree of temporary support issued
by a Pennsylvania court, and because of the fact that divorce
proceedings were first begun in Pennsylvania two years prior to
the present divorce action in Utah, counsel for appellant
strongly urged the trial court both during trial and at the
Motion for New Trial to consider the provisions of Pennsylvania
law in deciding whether any award of alimony was appropriate.
Until July 1, 1980,

just one month before the trial of the

present action, Pennsylvania law did not allow for any award of
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permanent alimony after a decree of divorce unless the wife was
insane.
1974).

E.g., Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 329 A.2d 483, 488 (Pa.
It shold also be remembered that the parties had been

separated since August of 1972 and appellant had already
provided under decree of the Pennsylvania court, for the
support of respondent alone, without adding in support for his
children, over $32,000 by the time of trial (R. 226).
Moreover, the respondent had begun full time employment in 1976
and during the calendar year 1979 she had a gross income of
$16,824.

At the time of trial, not including the support money

she was receiving from appellant, and after deducting federal,
state and city taxes and social security, respondent still had
a monthly expendable income of $1,332.02 (R. 266, Defendant's
Exhibit 9).
Given the above, it is evident that the delay in the
Pennsylvania divorce proceedings, which proceedings respondent
admits she was contesting (R. 268), clearly caused an enormous
windfall to accrue to the respondent in light of the trial
court's generous award to her of property and alimony.

Unless

the trial court's award of alimony is reversed, respondent will
have obtained the best of both worlds, over $32,000 in
temporary alimony plus a very generous award of property and
permanent alimony.
It is also evident that the trial court was impressed
with the change in Pennsylvania law effective July 1, 1980,
which allowed an award of alimony for the first time, because
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on the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, after counsel for
appellant cited Stambaugh v. Stambaugh for the proposition that
Pennsylvania law does not allow an award of permanent alimony
after divorce, the court responded with: "Hasn't the error of
that decision been changed by act of the legislature?" (R.
307).

Also noted by counsel for appellant, both at the trial

and at the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, was the
provision of the new law providing that:
The provisions of this act shall not affect any suit
or action pending, but the same may be proceeded
with and concluded either under the laws in
existence when such suit or action was instituted,
notwithstanding repeal of such laws by this act, or,
upon application granted, under the provisions of
this act.
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §103, as amended by Act No. 1980-26, as
quoted from Purdon's Pennsylvania Legislative Service, 1980,
Pamphlet No. 1, at page 50.

Moreover, although the court

apparently did not apply Pennsylvania law at all, an award of
alimony was inconsistent with the terms of the new law.

That

is because 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §501, as amended by Act No.
1980-26 (the new divorce law) provides:
The court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable,
to either party, only if it finds that the party
seeking alimony:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including but
not limited to any property distributed
pursuant to chapter 4, to provide for his or
her reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself or herself
through appropriate employment. (emphasis added)
The trial court's award to respondent of substantial property,
including the entire Devon real property and approximately half
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of appellant's stock holdings, together with respondent's net
monthly expendable income in excess of $1,300 plainly would
disqualify respondent from receiving an award of alimony under
even the new Pennsylvania Statute.
While admittedly Pennsylvania law is not strictly
binding on the trial court as to an award of alimony given the
court's jurisdiction over the persons of the parties, still, in
the exercise of its equitable powers, the court should not have
completely disregarded Pennsylvania law when there is such a
close nexus between the parties, especially the respondent, and
Pennsylvania.
More importantly, the trial court's award of alimony
in the present action also was erroneous as an abuse of
discretion under Utah case law precedents.

In perhaps the most

recent definitive explanation of the purpose of alimony by this
court, in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, at 147 (Utah 1979),
it was stated:
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed
on the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife.
Its function is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during marriage and to prevent her from
becoming a public charge.
Important criteria in
determining a reasonable award for support and
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs
of the wife, considering her station in life; her
ability to produce sufficient income for herself;
and the ability of the husband to provide support.
This enumeration of criteria to be considered in
deciding whether an award of alimony is appropriate and in what
amount, is significant in its listing of priorities.

From its
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place at the end of the list, it is evident that the ability of
the husband to provide support only becomes relevant after it
is determined that the wife does not have sufficient income to
support herself at the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage.

Where the separate property or income of the wife

after divorce allows her to maintain such a standard of living,
it would be inappropriate to punish the husband and reward the
wife with a grant of substantial alimony just because the
husband's income is higher than that of the wife.
Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979).

Read v.

That is particularly true in

the present situation where, over the course of the separation
of the parties lasting almost eight years, the respondent has
successfully begun to rebuild her separate life with the
support assistance she received from the appellant.
The trial court's award of alimony on top of a
generous property award to the respondent is truly a harsh
penalty for the appellant to bear after such a long separation
during which the appellant has supported his children and
carried the burden of supporting the respondent even though, at
the time of the separation of the parties, she was a college
graduate whose children were eleven years old or older, in
school, and without apparent health problems.

It must be

remembered that the appellant's career was well established at
the time he married the respondent who can not be said to have
had any responsibility for helping him in his chosen profession.
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Furthermore, the respondent was awarded,

in addition

to the real property in Devon, of which appellant only seeks
his just share, approximately half of the stock holdings of the
appellant.

If the appellant is able to prevail on the present

appeal, he does not begrudge this award of stocks to the
respondent, which award, by respondent's own valuation,
exceeded $53,000 in readily convertible assets at the time of
trial (Defendant's Exhibit 8).

It must also be remembereed

that the stocks appellant was awarded as his share are pledged
to Merrill Lynch for the $27,000 or more loan he took out to
make the down payment on his home in Salt Lake when he moved
here, which home is still encumbered with a mortgage to Walker
Bank for $51,000 (R. 222,230).

It is thus apparent that the

respondent has been amply provided for, and that the trial
court's award of alimony was only made either on the basis of
the misleading valuations provided in Defendant's Exhibit 8
admitted over appellant's objection (R. 278), on the basis of
Defendant's Exhibit 10 which shows inflated living expenses for
respondent because, on her own admission, it included expenses
for three or four of her children too (R. 275-76,

280-81), or

in light of appellant's current salary which has reached its
present level only after 30 years of professional experience,
at least the first six and the last eight of which were without
effective benefit of any of the real support or comfort one
hopes for in a marital relationship.

To now approve the trial

court's award of alimony would be to countenance an additional
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burden truly of a punitive nature.

In an equitable action such

as the present proceeding, to neglect such considerations is
clearly an abuse of discretion not in accord with the evidence.
Therefore,

for failure to even consider the provisions

of Pennsylvania law, and for failure to properly apply Utah
precedents, as evidenced by the present patent abuse of
discretion, the trial court's award of alimony should be
reversed and vacated.

CONCLUSION

For the failure of the trial court to apply
Pennsylvania real property law to the home located on
Schoolhouse Road in Devon, Pennsylvania, the trial court's
award of that entire parcel of real estate to the respondent
should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court
with a direction to apply Pennsylvania law as to that parcel of
real property.

In the alternative, Utah law requires that

appellant be awarded a value equivalent to that contributed by
him to the purchase of the Devon real property out of his
separate funds brought to the marriage.

Finally, the trial

court abused its discretion in this equitable proceeding in
making an award of alimony to the respondent by not at least
considering the law of Pennsylvania as to alimony and by not
properly applying Utah law on the subject.

This error should

be corrected by declaring that respondent is not entitled to
any award of alimony.
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DATED this

tf~

day of March, 1981.

Respectfully submitted,
NIELSE

By

& SENIOR

~a};;m W\ ~""==

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of March,

1981, I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to B. L. Dart, of DART & STEGALL, Attorneys
for Defendant, at 430 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101.
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